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About 40 percent of the world’s food supply came from rice and wheat-based foods. 
The genome of wheat (a genome is a set of chromosomes) was much larger than 
those of other crops such as rice.  Deciphering the wheat genome was a much more 
complex process.  Wheat had six DNA strands (e.g., humans have only a double-
helix DNA strand) and almost twice as many genes as humans.  GM wheat would be 
available for production by 2004.  The objective of this case is to describe: 
segregation and identity-preservation issues in the wheat value chain, the role of 
Cargill in that value chain, and issues surrounding the introduction of genetically 
modified wheat. 
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The use of genetic engineering in crops provided a signal that changes were 
underway in the way commodities were produced and marketed.  Genetically 
modified (GM) products had value only if they could be produced and marketed in 
sufficient volumes to meet the needs of processors.  Most of the markets for these 
products were likely to be small initially, so they represented niche markets.  Grain 
handling systems would have to develop cost-effective, identity-preserved marketing 
channels in order to provide these products to their end user, if the product benefits 
were to be realized. 
 
Thus far, the concern over GM crops had been limited to corn and soybeans.  Wheat 
was much different.  About 40 percent of the world’s food supply came from rice and 
wheat-based foods. The genome of wheat (a genome is a set of chromosomes) was 
much larger than those of other crops such as rice.  Deciphering the wheat genome 
was a much more complex process.  Wheat had six DNA strands (e.g., humans have 
only a double-helix DNA strand) and almost twice as many genes as humans.  GM 
wheat would be available for production by 2004. 
 
Mr. Warren Staley was the new chief executive officer of Cargill which ranked 
fourth in sales among food and beverage companies (behind Philip Morris, Con 
Agra, and PepsiCo) in 1999 according to Food Processing magazine. It was a 
marketer, processor, and distributor of agricultural, food, financial, and industrial 
products and services with 85,000 employees in 60 countries.  It also was the United 
States’ largest grain exporter (Hayenga and Wisner).  Warren was in charge of 
implementing Cargill’s new corporate strategy.  Obviously, the introduction of GM 
wheat would affect Cargill who owned a wheat breeding unit, Goertzen Seed 
Research, and was focusing on value creation in food and feed grains, especially in 
flour milling. 
 
Mr. Warren Staley 
 
Warren R. Staley had succeeded Ernest S. Micek as chief executive officer of Cargill 
on June 1, 1999 and had served as president since February 1998. Mr. Staley, a 
native of Springfield, Illinois, joined Cargill in 1969 after receiving a BS degree in 
electrical engineering from Kansas State University and an MBA from Cornell 
University. He was general manager of the company’s high-fructose corn syrup 
operations at Dayton, Ohio, before being named assistant general manager of corn 
milling operations at Tilbury, England.  Mr. Staley was general manager of Cargill’s 
European corn milling business from 1978 to 1982. He was general manager of 
Cargill’s Argentine operations from 1983 to 1987 and then was president of the 
international feed and meat businesses and head of North American operations 
until he was elected Cargill president in 1998.  He also had been a member of the 
Cargill board of directors since 1995. 
 
Mr. Staley’s first year priorities as Cargill’s chief executive officer had focused on 
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businesses and to lead the implementation of the newly developed strategic plan. 
The strategic plan was developed by a senior management team and had received 
final approval by the board of directors in February 1999.  With the time horizon for 
the strategic plan extending to 2010, Warren had announced that “ . . .There likely 
will be some changes in Cargill operations and businesses. Cargill’s core businesses 
have always been our grain and grain processing operations.  We do not expect that 
to change.  But we will create platforms so that our business units can offer 
integrated solutions to our customer’s problems in all of our businesses.” 
 
Strategic Intent 2010 
 
Cargill recognized that it would need to retain its skills as a low-cost provider of 
ingredients and commodity products and simultaneously remake itself into a high-
value provider of innovative customer solutions. 
Their strategic intent was about creating distinctive value for their customers.  That 
means they aimed to deliver innovative customer solutions that were hard for others 
to match. 
 
Cargill’s vision and mission statement read: 
Cargill’s corporate vision expresses the collective aspirations of the people who work 
here. It unifies us, directs our efforts and sets us apart from other companies. 
  
Vision Statement  
 
Our purpose is to be the global leader in nourishing people.  
We will harness our knowledge and energy to provide goods and 
services that are necessary for life, health and growth.  
Our mission is to create distinctive value.  
We will succeed in business only by creating value for our customers, 
our suppliers, employees, shareholders and neighbors. We will build 
stronger customer relations and create solutions: Explore, Discover, 
Create, and Deliver.  
Our approach is to be trustworthy, creative and enterprising.  
We build customer relationships on integrity. We develop solutions that 
our customers need. We are forward thinking and action-oriented.  
Our performance measures are engaged employees, satisfied customers, enriched 
communities and profitable growth.  
Engaged employees focus on satisfying customers and are committed to 
livable, sustainable communities. With those accomplishments, we will enjoy 
the profitable growth necessary to sustain performance over time. 
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Cargill’s long-term philosophy of reinvesting its cash flow into growth opportunities 
had been a hallmark that allowed it to remain a private company.  Cargill had 
periodically revised its mission statement over time in response to industry and firm 
changes.  However, its core beliefs remained fundamentally the same. 
Our Basic Beliefs   
 
Our basic beliefs are the cornerstones of the relationships we build with customers, 
suppliers, business associates, shareholders and the communities in which we do 
business:  
• Integrity. Our word is our bond.  
• Excellence. Making Cargill the best at whatever it does.  
• Growth. Creating opportunities for individuals and our business.  
• Teamwork. Pooling individual knowledge and skills through effective 
communication to build shared success.  
• Long-term perspective. Having the patience and foresight to build sustainable 
businesses for the long haul.  
• Desire to compete. Seeking to win in open, level playing field. 
  
Joint Ventures and Acquisitions 
 
One visible sign of the strategic intent was the number of joint ventures that Cargill 
had entered into in recent years. Several were related to wheat.  All of these 
relationships were formed around opportunities for increasing the value of existing 
commodities or taking advantage of new markets.  Warren had indicated that “We 
will partner with organizations whose beliefs are similar to ours.   Integrity, honesty, 
and teamwork must exist among all partners.” 
 
Wind River and Cornerstone LLC’s   
 
Cargill and Garden City Co-op, Inc., Kansas, formed an LLC (with Irsik & Doll and 
Sublette Co-op) that owned and operated a grain handling facility in Garden City, 
Kansas.  It had a combined storage capacity of more than 1.4 million bushels. The 
latest grain handling technology was installed to create a highly automated, high-
speed, loading and discharge facility that was capable of loading and unloading 110-
railcar unit trains.  A similar joint venture (Cornerstone LLC) had been formed in 




Cargill’s 16 flour mills were placed into a joint venture with five flour mills owned 
by CHS Cooperatives.  This joint venture was called Horizon Milling and had a daily 
flour milling capacity of approximately 290,000 hundredweights of flour. 
 




Cargill acquired Continental Grain’s grain merchandising assets in 1999.  This 
acquisition enabled Cargill to achieve broader economies of scale and allowed them 
to dedicate some facilities for use in identity-preserved marketing channels.  Also, it 
gave Cargill an estimated 35 percent market share of the US export volume of corn, 
soybeans, and wheat (Hayenga and Wisner). 
Other New Initiatives 
  
Joint ventures and partnerships were only parts of Cargill’s new initiatives.  Other 
visible signs of its strategic intent included advertising and image programs, as well 




Cargill rarely used widespread promotional advertising because its customers were 
primarily industrial processors; but by the 1990s, Cargill was heavily involved in 
food production, and market research indicated that some people had little 
knowledge about Cargill and its role in the global food industry.  Consequently, it 
decided to embark upon a print and television advertising promotion campaign in 
1999.  The theme, “It’s not just what we do. It’s how we do it,” communicated the 
message that Cargill not only provided a broad base of quality products, but also 
built long-lasting partnerships with employees, communities, customers, and 




Cargill’s identification traditionally had not appeared on many of its physical assets.  
In fact, if there was any visible identification, it was usually only its logo.  However, 
in 1999, Cargill embarked on a system-wide identification program.  For example, 
its farm service and other related assets were identified physically with the green 
Cargill AgHorizons™ trademark. 
 
Higher Education Initiative 
 
Cargill had launched an initiative in 1996 aimed at developing partnerships with 
universities that were located in its core business area and instituted academic 
programs which provided opportunities for students to become involved with Cargill 
through internships and other similar programs.  Cargill had grown from 60,000 
employees in 1991 to over 85,000 in 2000.  Thus, it was important that students be 
exposed to career opportunities within Cargill.  Major initiatives were started in the 
Colleges of Agriculture and Engineering at five schools (Iowa State University, 
Kansas State University, University of Illinois, University of Minnesota, and 
University of Wisconsin).  In addition, smaller programs were set up at 14 other 
universities.  Funding was granted over a five-year period for study-abroad 
programs, Cargill named scholarship programs, computer laboratory renovations, Dr. M. Boland / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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hardware and software acquisitions; faculty internships and fellowships; student 
and faculty field trips to Cargill facilities; classroom and laboratory technology 
improvements in agriculture, business, and engineering schools; diversity 







The Cargill Foundation historically has been involved with various community 
organizations and charities, but it began several new innovative programs designed 
to focus on educational success and the development of necessary skills that enabled 





As a privately held company, Cargill did not issue an annual report to the general 
public. However, the company did release quarterly financial data (Exhibit 1).  Sales 
had decreased over the past five years, although total assets had increased by 15 
percent.  The sales decrease was due primarily to depressed demand for 
commodities worldwide.  An increase in global capacity in various industries (e.g., 
corn wet milling, soybean processing, fertilizer production, and wheat wet milling) 
led to an expectation of increasing worldwide demand due to free trade agreements, 
and increased income that could be used on protein and other foods.  Other changes 
in tastes and preferences meant that ingredient production had increased faster 
than demand, which resulted in downward pressure on prices.  Favorable weather 
improved farming practices that increased productivity, and additional land in 
various regions such as Brazil had resulted in an increase in the supply of 
agricultural commodities at a time of weak demand, which also depressed farm 
prices.  
 
In January 1999, Cargill announced a net operating loss in the past six months that 
ended November 30, 1998, and was largely due to financial trading losses in Russia 
and emerging markets. However, that was offset by a one-time after-tax gain on the 
sale of its international seed business to Monsanto.  As part of its focus on core 
operations, Cargill announced an agreement to sell off its coffee businesses in June 
2000 and confirmed that it planned to exit the rubber industry.  A Cargill press 
release noted that its operating earnings for fiscal year 2000 were higher than those 
for 1999 due to strong performances from several businesses, including financial 
markets, family, and beef processing.  It also made progress in the restructuring and 
implementation of its corporate strategy focused on value creation and superior 
service. 
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Cargill’s businesses were organized into five segments.  Agriculture Services 
provided crop and livestock producers worldwide with customized farm services and 
products. Origination and Processing linked producers and users of grain, oilseeds 
and other agricultural commodities through origination, processing, marketing and 
distribution capabilities and services.  Food Ingredients and Applications served 
global, regional and local food manufacturers, food service companies, and retailers 
with food and beverage ingredients, meat and poultry products and new food 
applications.  Risk Management and Financial provided Cargill customers and the  
Exhibit 1. Selected Income and Balance Sheet Data for Cargill, 1996 to 2000 
 
Category 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Sales 55,979  55,695  51,418  45,697  47,602 
Earnings 902  814  468  597  480 
Current Assets  14,991  16,500  19,930  16,356  15,355 
Property and Other Assets  6,022  6,921  7,139  8,221  8,813 
Total Assets  21,013  23,421  27,069  24,577  24,168 
Current Liabilities  11,908  12,800  15,507  12,272  11,377 
Net Worth  5,942  6,592  6,836  7,592  7,888 
 
company with risk management and financial solutions in world markets.  
Industrial supplied customers worldwide with fertilizer, salt and steel products and 
services, and develops industrial applications for agricultural feedstock.   
 
One product that offered opportunities and challenges for value creation was wheat.  
Wheat was the second most commonly grown food and feed grain in the world (corn 
was first) and was the most widely traded grain internationally.  Relative to other 
crops such as corn, soybeans, and cotton, wheat had not attracted a great deal of 
attention in recent years.  Changes were beginning to take place in the wheat value 
chain, and Cargill was playing a key role in those changes.  
 




Private firms had developed crop varieties such as corn largely because these were 
hybrids.  That is, producers purchased hybrid seed because hybrids could not self-
pollinate.  The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that 
public expenditures on wheat research were almost 85 percent of total wheat 
research expenditures. Wheat seed had the lowest increase in price between 1975 
and 1992 (0.97 percent per year) relative to hybrid corn (4.75 percent), hybrid 
sorghum (5.08 percent), and non-hybrid soybeans (1.92 percent).  Seed companies Dr. M. Boland / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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were able to obtain 35 (sorghum) to 48 (corn) percent of the improved hybrid seed 
value compared to 24 percent for wheat.  This resulted in private firms investing 
over 10 percent of seed sales in hybrid seed research, compared to only five percent 
on wheat.  Publicly funded breeding programs accounted for the majority of wheat 






Exhibit 2. The Relationship of Wheat Class and Protein Levels Relative to Various Products 
  Wheat Protein Percent 
Class 9  10  11  12 13  14 
Durum           Pasta 
Hard  
white/red 




















Wheat was produced on farms in various regions of the US.  The USDA classified 
wheat into classes for identification purposes based on kernel color (white or red), 
growth habit (spring or winter), and kernel hardness (hard or soft).   There were six 
wheat classes: hard red winter, durum, hard red spring, soft red winter, soft white, 
and hard white wheat.  In general, hard red and white wheats were the only classes 
used in bread making, which made their protein level (i.e., percentage) of great 
interest to bakers (Exhibit 2). 
 
Protein level helped determine the wheat’s end use, but the level of protein 
depended upon several factors.  First, the class and variety of wheat were major 
determinants.  Higher protein wheat varieties were typically of the hard red class, 
whereas lower protein wheats were of the soft white or red class.  However, within 
each class, protein was extremely variable depending upon the variety.   
 
Because no value-based marketing program existed for wheat (i.e., producers were 
not paid typically on protein percentage), wheat breeders often bred varieties for 
improvements in yield or tolerance to drought stress rather than improving protein, Dr. M. Boland / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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because these were easily identifiable traits that improved a producer’s gross 
revenue.  Weather played a large role in determining the protein content through its 
effect on kernel size and growth.  Thus, it was relatively difficult to forecast, with 





After harvest, producers delivered the wheat to country grain elevators, where it 
was aggregated and shipped to main terminal elevators.  Here the wheat was 
sorted, graded, and measured for protein.  Then, the wheat was milled into flour and 
other products.  The dry milling process yielded flour that was composed of protein 
(primarily gluten) and starch.  At this stage, the miller separated the starch from 
the wheat grains and also removed the bran and germ.  During this process, several 
steps occurred.  First, the wheat was cleaned and moistened.  Then the wheat was 
sent through various pairs of rollers, which broke the kernel into fine particles and 
separated the bran and flour.  The particles were rolled and sifted until as much 
flour as possible was created.  One bushel of wheat weighed 60 pounds, which 
produced about 43 to 44 pounds of flour as well as by-products composed of bran and 
mill feed.  Although seasonal variations occurred, the price of wheat generally 
comprised about 80 percent of the cost of bakery flour and the value of the by-




Bakers were able to change the tenacity of dough to obtain various specialty 
products such as raisin and whole grain breads, cakes, and pastries by varying the 
proportion of gluten.  Consequently, the protein level in wheat helped determine 
what its end use would be.  Because it was difficult to forecast what the protein level 
would be in any given year, bakers required a substitute for protein (such as vital 
wheat gluten) in years when protein in wheat was low in order to maintain the 
quality of their products.  Furthermore, bakers purchased ingredients several 
months in advance of when they were needed.  Thus, bakers also required a stable 
source of protein from year to year. 
 
North American Flour Milling 
 
Cargill did not enter the flour milling industry until 1972, and yet it had become one 
of the world’s largest flour millers with significant investments in the United States, 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, India, and Venezuela.  It supplied flour for food 
processors and manufacturers, retailers with in-store bakeries, food service firms, 
and retail grocers.  The new joint venture called Horizon Milling would likely open 
new doors for Cargill’s flour milling operations. 
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Guy Shoemaker, president of North American Flour Milling, believed that the flour 
milling industry was going to undergo change in the future.  He indicated that “We 
want to supply flour for our customers that has the consistency and quality that they 
want.” 
 
Senior vice president, Gary Yee, added “We’re talking about pretty specific quality 
requirements.  That means we need to be able to source wheats that have our quality 
targets bred into them.” 
 
As part of its new strategy, North American Flour Milling was beginning to mill 
identity-preserved wheats that had specific quality traits designed for its customers. 
North American Grain was supplying these wheats through identity-preserved 
marketing channels.   
 
Hard White Wheat 
 
One large change in quality was the development of hard white wheat varieties. 
Research at General Mills found that consumer panels preferred products made 
with 100 percent white wheat 90 percent of the time relative to products made from 
red wheat.  Traditionally, millers removed the red bran from red wheat and 
bleached it to create white bread.  If the bran were left in, the bread would have a 
reddish brown color.  If whole wheat bread was made from white wheat, it would not 
have the dark color and slightly bitter taste, and it also would provide consumers 
with six times as much fiber as existing white bread which would help improve 
human nutrition. 
 
Hard white wheat also had other benefits.  Because the bran did not have to be 
removed during milling, more flour could be created from the bran.  Thus, a miller 
could obtain more flour from a bushel of wheat.   
 
The introduction of hard white wheat into the US presented several problems for 
wheat marketing channels.  First, white wheat must be kept separate from hard red 
wheat, or face being severely discounted.  Second, because white wheat varieties 
were developed for specific end uses such as noodles or bread, the wheat must be 
marketed through an identity-preserved marketing channel that allowed end users 
to purchase wheat from suppliers.  Finally, because of a small supply (250,000 acres 
projected for 2002), increased marketing investments in identity-preserved 
marketing channels were needed to locate end users. 
 
Goertzen Seed Research 
 
The identity-preserved hard red wheats were grown from seed germplasm developed 
by Goertzen Seed Research (Haven, Kansas), which had been acquired jointly by 
Cargill’s North American Flour Milling and North American Grain in 1994.  
Improving endosperm quality was one of the primary goals of the Goertzen wheat-Dr. M. Boland / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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breeding program.  A flour miller wanted the maximum amount of flour extraction 
per bushel, whereas a baker wanted protein quantity and quality.  Cargill also 
owned a Bake Lab near its Minneapolis headquarters, where various wheat samples 
were analyzed for baking qualities.  Cargill informed breeders of the importance of 
milling and baking quality traits.  Consequently, public and private wheat breeders 
gradually were developing “loaf bread,” “noodle,” and “cracker” wheats. 
 
Cargill had also long sought hard white wheats.  Goertzen Seed Research developed 
an early hard white wheat variety, Snow White, and contracted with producers for 
its use in Cargill’s mills.  However, it was not well adapted to the Great Plains.  
Cargill cooperated with wheat breeders at Kansas State University in the 
development of their first hard white wheat varieties in 1999 and developed one of 
the first identity-preserved wheat programs in the Great Plains with the 
Karl/Karl92 hard red wheat varieties which possessed excellent baking qualities in 
1993.  To encourage producer adoption, Cargill had developed a program that paid 
producers economic incentives to grow hard white wheat.  Because these wheats had 
to be kept separate, North American Grain developed identity-preserved programs 
near its elevators in western Kansas and eastern Colorado.  
 
Certified Seed and Farmer-Saved Seed 
 
The key problem with identity-preserved hard white wheat was providing sufficient 
economic incentives to ensure that producers planted enough wheat to satisfy 
demand for large-scale flour mills, so as to obtain the cost savings from the higher 
extraction rate.  However, wheat producers were unique in that much of the wheat 
was grown from farmer-saved seed.  Certified seed from public varieties and seed 
varieties of private companies was defined as seed that had passed field inspection 
and seed testing standards for varietal purity, absence of certain wheat, and other 
crop seeds and certain diseases. In addition, most certified seed and private seed 
were treated with a fungicide to control seedborne and seedling diseases. Typically, 
certified seed also exceeded 85 percent germination. 
 
Non-certified seed was called farmer-saved or homegrown seed.  Certified seed was 
more “pure” (less weeds or foreign material) because it had been cleaned, but it also 
had higher costs. The overwhelming majority of producers planted certified seed the 
first year and then used farmer-saved seed for one to two years until seed purity 
declined, and then they purchased certified seed again. Very few producers plant 
certified wheat seed on all of their acres.  
 
Mixing red and white wheats would result in severe discounts.  If white wheat and 
red wheat were planted next to each other in a field, the potential existed for cross-
pollination.  Seedcoat color was a maternal characteristic.  If a red wheat plant 
pollinated a white wheat plant, the wheat remained white.  But if that wheat plant 
were saved back as seed, then the next generation would be a red wheat plant.  Dr. M. Boland / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
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Thus, it was imperative that producers maintain the purity of hard white wheat, 
otherwise, its value would be lost. 
 
The only way was to ensure that producers only planted certified seed that was 
guaranteed to be hard white wheat, but certified seed was also more expensive.  A 
recent study of the price spread between certified seed at retail farm stores and 
farmer-saved seed had found a differential of $3.51 per bushel or about $0.11 per 
bushel. Thus, producers would need to receive a premium of at least that amount to 




Costs of identity-preservation at the elevator also would increase.  Another study 
found these costs to be under $0.02 per bushel for a typical country grain elevator.  
These would have to be passed along in the marketing channel. 
 
Obviously, it took time to produce enough seed so those producers could begin 
planting the new hard white wheats.  Least-cost, identity-preserved marketing 
channels were those that could provide enough volume to fill a processor’s plant 
capacity.  Mr. Terry Garvert, Cargill’s manager of foodgrain market development for 
the Grain Division, frequently used the following analogy when talking to producers 
about the need to increase production of hard white wheat.  He said, 
“Critical mass is usually determined by the “rule of 300,000.”  A wheat yield of 50 
bushels per acre planted on 6,000 acres yields 300,000 bushels of wheat or 
approximately 8,000 metric tons.  This volume is approximately equal to one 100-unit 
car train or one hold in a Panamax vessel.  Tripling 300,000 bushels equals an ocean 
going vessel and 12 times that (36 times 300,000 bushels) is an ocean going vessel 
every month for 12 months.” 
 
One goal of Cargill’s strategic intent, with respect to grain, was to create value for 
its international grain customers and its domestic flour customers.  The 
international grain market was becoming more sophisticated as large central buying 
agencies in many countries were being dismantled and trade barriers were being 
reduced.  Individual millers were beginning to purchase wheat based on its milling 
characteristics.  For example, recent trade agreements such as the entry of China 
into the World Trade Organization required countries to purchase a certain 
percentage of their wheat outside the centralized buying agency.  Thus, one way to 
create value was to develop wheats designed for specific end uses, produce them in 
identity-preserved marketing channels, and test them in a baking laboratory. 
 
Cargill also was developing risk-management programs that would enable 
producers and other customers to better manage market price risk. One such 
program enabled producers to share overall gains from Cargill’s hedging operations.  
Producers who had contracted wheat through Cargill AgHorizon’s Average Plus (A+) 
contract for the 1999/2000 crop year received $0.11 more per bushel above the Dr. M. Boland / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol 6 Iss 3 2003 
 
  13
average futures price during the pricing period.  These programs helped provide 
price risk protection for producers who contracted with Cargill for one of its identity-
preserved wheats.  
 
Biotechnology Influences Wheat Value Chain 
 
Cargill issued a position statement on biotechnology in December 1999 stating that 
it would continue to accept all crops developed under traditional breeding or genetic 
engineering programs. However, Cargill’s oilseed plants would use only varieties 
that had been approved by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), 
whereas its corn wet-milling plants would accept those varieties approved by the 
EU.  Because the approved varieties were ones already being planted by producers, 
the statement did not drastically change any existing practices.  Because there were 
no GM wheats at the present time, there was no need to issue any statement 
regarding wheat. 
 
Genetic engineering enabled animal and plant breeders to better control exactly 
when and where a particular gene was expressed and the amount of the gene 
product.  Many of these genes could not be observed through traditional breeding 
methods, such as natural mutations, cross breeding, and selection.  Thus, breeders 
were able to develop new crop varieties whose genes were resistant to certain 
herbicides (Roundup Ready soybeans™) or pesticides (Bt corn).  Many, but not all, of 
these new plants were “GM or enhanced” products.  Many of these products enabled 
producers to lower their use of certain production inputs and increase yields, which 
meant rapid adoption by many producers.  Potential improvements in wheat using 
genetic engineering would be better seed protein quality or uniform kernel size.  
Increasing the number of certain glutenin proteins would help strengthen dough for 
bakers.  Modifications to the amount of starch contained in wheat were another 
possibility for wheat wet millers such as Cargill. 
 
Genetically Modified Wheat 
 
Availability of GM wheats were imminent.  The USDA Field Release Database found 
that 21 release permits in the field test releases had been issued for wheat and 
another 136 for notifications for field test releases. The overwhelming majority were 
herbicide-tolerant or virus-resistant wheats.  Initial test results indicated that a 
significant decrease would occur in weeds, which would increase yields per acre.  
Thus, GM wheats likely would be adopted by producers, if the costs of the seed were 
less than the sum of the revenue from increased yields and any cost savings from 
reduced crop inputs.  
 
Herbicide-resistant wheat would be available for Colorado producers in 2002.  
American Cyanamid had worked with land grant universities, public and private 
laboratories, and seed companies to develop wheat varieties tolerant to 
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and residual control of weeds common to wheat production.  The IMI wheat was not 
developed using genetic engineering (i.e., it was not GM), but researchers at 
Monsanto were developing a Roundup Ready wheat that also was herbicide 
resistant and was GM.  Four land grant universities (Oregon State, Washington 
State, South Dakota State, and the University of Minnesota) signed agreements 
with Monsanto to develop a Roundup Ready hard spring wheat by 2003. 
 
Two potential problems existed regarding consumer acceptance of these wheats.  
First, it was not clear whether IMI wheat would be viewed as GM wheat. The 
potential for customers to be confused over what was GM wheat and what was not 
was likely once these two products had been commercialized.  Even though it would 
be 2004 before producers would be able to purchase seed to plant GM wheat (e.g., 
Roundup Ready wheat), a spokesperson for the leading wheat export market 
development association, US Wheat Associates, already had indicated that Egypt 
and Japan had stated that they did not want it.  
 
Second, some scientists were worried that GM wheat (such as Roundup Ready 
wheat) would cross naturally with related species and produce a “super weed.”  
Jointed goatgrass, a troublesome weed for producers, had a shared genome with 
wheat.  It had four sets of chromosomes (compared to wheat’s six), and two of them 
were from a parent species that it shared with wheat.  Thus, a herbicide that killed 
jointed goatgrass also would kill wheat.  If the herbicide-resistant gene was inserted 
into one of the shared genes, such a “super weed” might develop. 
 
Labeling of Biotechnology 
 
A recent lawsuit ruled in September 2000 that the government did not have to 
require labels, such as those required for food additives, for GM foods.  However, the 
Food and Drug Administration did allow food manufacturers to voluntarily label 
their products, and a disclaimer likely would be added stating that there was no 
difference between GM and non-GM foods.  Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the EU, 
and Australia had announced plans to begin labeling of foods containing ingredients 
that contained GM food or feed grains.  It was unclear what would happen in the 
US, but the recent recall of products that contained the only GM corn not approved 
for use in humans, Starlink genetics, had caused a disruption among food 
companies. 
 
The demand for GM foods was still a niche market.  For example, the price 
differential between the futures contract for Tokyo Grain Exchange’s new GM 
soybean (of US origin) and that for its existing conventional soybean (of US origin) 
was not sufficient to recoup the costs of the identity-preserved system for the GM 
soybean. 
 
Identity-Preserved Crop Production 
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The value chain of crop production to processing and on to consumers had 
undergone change. The government was mandating systems that could help 
measure and reduce food pathogens through intervention technologies.  Cargill was 
one of the first companies to use steam pasteurization, which effectively reduced 
food pathogens in meat.  But concern over safety was only part of the drive towards 
identity-preserved programs, or as Cargill called them, “a traceable chain of custody 
programs.” 
 
The need to develop marketing chains that would enable processors to fully utilize 
the benefits of GM crops also was driving the move towards identity-preserved 
crops.  Such changes would mean the development of an identity-preserved grain-
marketing channel.  Cargill already had experience with such marketing channels.  
For example, food-grade white corn and yellow corn were handled separately 
through its InnovaSure™ program at Cargill elevators that supplied its Illinois 
Cereal Mills plant.  Similarly, food-grade soybeans that had desired qualities for 
tofu also were handled separately.  Similar programs also existed.  All of these 
programs involved coordination with producers with respect to seed and delivery 
location.  However, little wheat was contracted at the present time, and significant 
amounts were not even found in the latest figures complied by the USDA. 
 
Identity-preserved marketing channels were more complicated than simply 
segregating crops during loading, unloading, storage, and transportation so as to 
avoid mixing the crops.  Identity-preserved channels implied that producers used 
separate fields to avoid mixing pollen or seeds during planting and harvesting and 
cleaned equipment and on-farm storage units.  Once the producer delivered the 
grain to an elevator, the manager also had to develop strict standards to maintain 
identity to the processor.  This would add additional costs, because it would be 
difficult to develop rapid storage and unloading systems that could accept two or 
more types of grain simultaneously at harvest.  Transportation of identity-preserved 
grains also posed problems, because the containers or rail cars would have to be 
sealed perfectly to avoid picking up any residue.  If tolerances for GM material were 
as low as one percent, the costs could increase significantly. 
 
Identity-preserved crop production was the first step in the development of an 
“auditable” food-marketing channel and might even involve the use of ISO 9000 or 
14000 protocols.  Cargill had knowledge of such systems because its Sunny Fresh 
Foods business became the first food company to receive the prestigious Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award in 1999. 
 
Increased focus on milling and baking quality was another reason for identity-
preserved marketing channels.  Some contracting through identity-preserved 
channels was being done for wheat with traits that were desirable for milling and 
baking.  For example, Con Agra contracted wheat varieties with producers in 
Colorado.  General Mills and Nabisco contracted specific varieties of hard and soft 
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identity-preserved channels for wheat.  Similarly, General Mills knew that some 
flakes in a box of Wheaties were flat, and some were curled.  Consumers preferred 
the curled flake, because it retained its crispness longer when milk was added.  This 
characteristic was a result of the wheat used to produce the flakes.  
 
Challenges and Opportunities   
 
It was difficult to get a clear picture with respect to the current rhetoric over GM 
crops.  After all, it started as a trade issue due to the EU’s rapidly increasing yields 
of coarse grains.  Limiting corn imports through failure to approve certain Bt corn 
varieties would likely force EU livestock producers to use coarse grains as livestock 
feed, which also would reduce EU exports and reduce their existing budgetary 
outlays to support these exports.  The recent entrance of Spain and Portugal (both 
large former importers of US corn) into the EU provided a large market for EU-
produced coarse grains.   
Cargill believed that the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements fully covered the regulatory approval 
processes for GM products, and science was an appropriate basis for governmental 
trade restrictions.  It was apparent that trade complications arising from attempts 
to regulate biotechnology needed to be considered by trade officials.  The World 
Trade Organization was the forum for reviewing the trade-related aspects of the 
activities conducted in the other forums.  
 
One challenge was how to maintain and improve Cargill’s image with its customers 
and other consumers.  The success of any value-creation strategy relied heavily upon 
trust.  Wheat was an important commodity in world trade markets and an integral 
ingredient in many different food products.  The introduction of IMI wheats and 
Roundup Ready wheats would likely confuse customers who were not sophisticated 
enough to know why one herbicide-tolerant wheat was GM and another (IMI wheat) 
was not. Cargill’s status and reputation in the world grain markets could help 
provide leadership in much the same way that its position statement on 
biotechnology (e.g., it would continue to purchase all corn and soybeans that had 
been accepted by the EU, whether they were GM or not) in December 1999 had 
“settled the grain markets.”   
 
A second challenge was how to best compete in a world wheat environment that was 
rapidly becoming more sophisticated.  Goertzen Seed Research developed hard red 
wheat varieties suitable for some milling purposes, but it did not have any quality 
hard white wheats, thus, Cargill would use the public varieties being developed by 
universities.  A key concern was that if the hard white wheats being introduced in 
Kansas and other states were not handled through an identity-preserved marketing 
channel, all the milling benefits would be lost.  It also was important that 
consumers knew that hard white wheat was not GM (Exhibit 3). 
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   Genetically  Modified? 
   Yes  No 




























Opportunities included the abilities to create value through identity-preserved 
marketing channels using new hard white wheat varieties and to develop better 
relationships with producers who provided the foundation for the success of any 
such programs.  Risk management services, marketing contracts, and joint ventures 
were three steps in building that relationship within the context of Cargill’s 
strategic intent.  Clearly, Cargill’s global leadership would be needed to help meet 
these challenges and take advantage of the opportunities in the wheat value chain.  
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